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Asymmetric capital-tax competition, unemployment and losses 
from capital market integration 
 
1   The  problem 
The international mobility of capital has massively increased over the last decades, govern-
ments distort trade by taxing or subsidizing capital, and unemployment is a persistent phe-
nomenon in many countries. The free-trade paradigm promises gains from international trade 
in a perfectly competitive world in the absence of taxation but leaves unanswered the question 
what the allocative impact is of trade when capital is mobile, when countries suffer from un-
employment, and when their governments engage in capital-tax competition. 
The present paper aims at exploring the impact of capital market integration in a multi-
country economy with heterogeneous countries, persistent rigid-wage unemployment and 
capital-tax competition. Each country produces the same consumption good with the help of 
labor and capital, and unemployment results from excessively high and rigid wage rates. 
Countries may differ with respect to their rigid wage rates, capital endowments and produc-
tion technologies.
1 Governments levy capital taxes at the source whose rates are not sign con-
strained and whose revenues are recycled to the consumers. Governments choose their tax to 
maximize national income (= welfare) taking account of how the domestic firms' demands for 
capital respond to the tax. We use that model to investigate the changes in the countries' allo-
cation and welfare, when moving from autarky to trade without taxation and from trade with-
out taxation to tax competition. 
There is a large and growing literature on capital tax competition. The classic papers of Zod-
row and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) analyze the impact of capital-tax competi-
tion on the provision of public goods when labor markets are perfectly competitive. Some of 
the subsequent literature took up the issue of tax competition in the presence of labor market 
distortions, e.g. Fuest and Huber (1999), Leite-Monteiro et al. (2003), Eggert and Goerke 
(2004), Ogawa et al. (2006) and Aronsson and Wehke (2008). However, these studies assume 
identical countries and therefore yield limited insight only in allocative effects of the transi-
tion from autarky to trade and tax competition. Symmetric tax competition means that trade 
does not take place and that inefficiencies of tax competition, if any, hit all countries alike. 
                                                 
1 The size of the countries' populations (= labor endowment) may vary as well. However, since all countries are 
assumed to suffer from unemployment the population size is irrelevant.
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Asymmetric tax competition is studied, e.g., by Wilson (1991), Bucovetsky (1991), DePater 
and Myers (1994), Peralta and van Ypersele (2005) and Sato and Thisse (2007). But none of 
these contributions deals with labor market distortions and unemployment
2. Peralta and van 
Ypersele (2005) address the issue of 'gains from trade' and find for quadratic production func-
tions that "… fiscal competition erodes some, but not all, of the gains from liberalization." 
(ibidem, p. 259). As we will present cases of trade losses in the present paper, Peralta and van 
Ypersele's result suggests that it is the combination of asymmetric tax competition and labor 
market distortions that has the potential of rendering capital market integration unfavorable 
for some countries. 
Taking the time-honored free-trade paradigm as a reference, there is, of course, a large litera-
ture on trade under various conditions of second best. In the present context the contributions 
of Kemp and Negishi (1970) and Eaton and Panagariya (1979) are worth mentioning who 
focus on gains from trade when commodities are taxed and factor markets are distorted. How-
ever, they do not model capital-tax competition. More recently, the issue of gains from trade 
has been linked to capital-tax competition, e.g. by Kessler et al. (2003) and Lockwood and 
Makris (2006), who analyze capital-tax financed redistribution policies and voting in econo-
mies without labor market distortions. Aloi et al. (2009) present a model of two countries 
which are identical except that the labor market in one country is perfectly competitive and 
unionized in the other country. They determine conditions under which either country prefers 
autarky to capital market integration. In their model, no tax competition takes place. 
Summing up, to our knowledge the consequences of capital market integration in a multi-
country economy with labor market distortions and asymmetric capital-tax competition have 
not yet been analyzed in the literature. The present paper aims to fill that gap. It considers 
'small countries' as in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) rather than model-
ing governments playing Nash in tax rates. With the concept of rigid-wage unemployment our 
model relates most closely to Ogawa et al. (2006). We deviate from their approach by drop-
ping the issue of public-good provision
3, by considering heterogeneous countries and by ad-
dressing the consequences of moving from autarky to trade and capital-tax competition. Fuest 
and Huber (1999) and later Ogawa et al. (2006) show that a government's optimal capital tax 
                                                 
2 A limiting case is Sato and Thisse (2007) who consider a labor market with heterogeneous skills, costly train-
ing and the need of matching the firms' skill needs. Yet their analysis relates to full employment except for a hint 
in the concluding remarks that fiscal competition might well trigger unemployment in a country. 
3 The issue of optimal provision of public goods is dropped in many contributions to the tax competition litera-
ture such as Leite-Monteiro et al. (2003), Eggert and Goerke (2004), Peralta and van Ypersele (2005) and Sato 
and Thisse (2007). Suppressing the fiscal purpose of capital taxation allows isolating the welfare-maximizing 
government's incentive to stimulate or discourage the use of capital in production. 
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rate may be positive or negative depending on whether capital and labor are substitutes or 
complements in production
4. These properties of the production technology will turn out to 
have a major impact on the allocative consequences of capital market integration. That is why 
we will analyze technologies with capital and labor being either substitutes or complements. 
Ultimately, it is an empirical issue, of course, what the relevant production technology is like. 
However, as the pertaining empirical evidence is quite complex, if not ambiguous, e.g. 
Griliches (1969), Bergström and Panas (1992) and Duffy et al. (2004), it appears to be appro-
priate and necessary clarifying the analytical consequences of alternative assumptions on pro-
duction technologies. 
The paper is organized as follows. After having introduced the model in Section 2, we iden-
tify conditions in Section 3 under which countries gain or lose in the transition from autarky 
to trade if capital is internationally mobile and governments do not tax capital. In Section 4 
we first characterize an individual government's optimal capital tax policy and show that it 
increases domestic employment for some given world market rate of interest. Then we inves-
tigate the allocative displacement effects that occur when the economy moves from trade 
without capital taxation to capital-tax competition. Under certain conditions that transition 
turns out to be welfare decreasing for some countries. Section 5 combines the results from the 
two previous sections and identifies conditions under which some countries suffer a welfare 
loss and a rise in unemployment in the transition from autarky to tax competition. Section 7 
concludes. Formal proofs of all propositions are delegated to the Appendix. 
 
2    The model: rigid wages, mobile capital and capital taxation 
Consider an n-country economy in which each country i = 1, …, n  produces the amount 
   ( ) ,
i
ii yY k =  i
                                                
                                 ( 1 )  
of a consumption good by means of capital input   and labor input   according to the 
strictly concave
i k i  
5 production function   that exhibits positive first derivatives. The consump-
tion good and capital are traded on competitive world markets at price   and interest rate 
i Y
1 y p ≡
 
)
4 If the output   is produced with capital input k and labor input  , capital and labor are said to be substi-
tutes in production, if 
( , Yk    
0 k Y <   , and complements, if  .  0 k Y >  
5 Assuming strictly concave production functions is indispensible because otherwise we would not obtain well-
defined factor demand functions. See equation (2) below. Unfortunately, in their general form strictly concave 
production functions give limited insights only. Therefore, we will later consider more specific parametric func-
tional forms as well. 
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r, respectively. Immobile labor is traded on domestic markets at the wage rate  , i = 1, …, n. 
The governments of all countries tax capital at the source such that the 'aggregate' producer in 
country  i faces the after-tax rental rate of capital, 
i w
: i rt i ρ = + , where   is the sign-
unconstrained
i t
6 capital tax rate. Firm i maximizes profits  : ii i i i yw k i π ρ = −−    as a price taker 
giving rise to the standard factor demand functions 
      and   () ,
i
ii kK w ρ = i ( ) ,
i
ii Lw ρ =   i
=−   /0
ii
wk k LYD
,                       ( 2 )  
where
7  ,  ,  /0
ii KY D ρ =<    /
ii
wk KY D= < D ,  , and    /
ii
k LY ρ =−   :
ii





k Y −>   ;   may be positive or negative. 
i
k Y  
Except for brief references to the benchmark model with flexible wage rates we focus exclu-
sively on scenarios of persistent rigid wages that are sufficiently high as to make all countries 
suffer from unemployment. More formally, denote by   the number of consumers residing 




      for  all  i = 1, …, n                        ( 3 )   ( ,
i
ii mL w ρ > ) i
According to (3),  ( ) ,
i
ii i mL w ρ 0 − >  consumers are unemployed and the  ( ) ,
i
ii L w ρ  jobs of-
fered by firm i are randomly allocated to consumers. As consumers spend their income on a 
single consumption good only we can do without utility functions. 
The national income of country i is  : ii i i i i i x rk t k w π =+ ++   , where  i k  is country i's aggregate 
capital endowment and where profits  i π  and the tax revenues   are recycled to the consum-
ers
ii tk
9. Combining (1), (2) and  iii ii yw k i π ρ =− −    yields national income (= welfare)  i x  as a 
function of  :  ,a n d ii rt w
   () ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, : , , , ,
ii i i i
i i ii ii ii i X tr w Y K r tw Lr tw rK r tw k ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ + − + − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦.              (4) 
                                                 
6 If  , capital is subsidized. To avoid clumsy wording we will use the term tax irrespective of the sign of  .   0 i t < i t
7 Capital letters denote functions and subscripts to capital letters denote first derivatives. To simplify notation we 
write   instead of   etc. 
i
k Y   ii
i
k Y  
8 More precisely, (3) is assumed to hold in all equilibria to be specified below. 
9 We need not specify the shares of profits and tax revenues allocated to individual consumers because we re-
frain from focusing on utility distributions. 
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The government of country i = 1, …, n is supposed to maximize national income  ( ) ,,
i
ii X trw 
with respect to the capital tax rate  . As the definition of  i t ( ) ,,
i
ii X trw in (4) shows, it ac-
counts for the impact of tax variations on its firm's factor demands (2) but takes as given the 
world price, r, of capital. 
For predetermined tax rates   the condition for clearing the world capital market is  1,..., n tt
   ( ) ,
j
j jj kK r t =+ ∑∑ j j w .                             ( 5 )  
If (5) is satisfied, the world market for the consumption good is also cleared which follows 
from summing (4) over all i. The concept of general equilibrium for the n-country economy is 
straightforward: For given capital endowments  1,..., n kk  and for persistent rigid wage rates 
 a tax-competition equilibrium with unemployment is formally determined by the set  1,..., n ww
() { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Ett r x y k
= =    where the allocation ( ) 1,..., ,,, iiii i xyk
=  
n  and the interest 
rate r satisfy the equations (1) – (5) for ( ) 1,..., n tt , and where government i = 1, …, n chooses 
its tax rate   as to maximize (4).  i t
It will turn out to be useful to consider also equilibria  () { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Ett r x y k
= =    in 
which tax rates are exogenously fixed rather than optimally chosen by the governments. We 
will call such equilibria constant-tax trade equilibria in contrast to tax-competition equilibria 
as defined in the last paragraph. Note that the no-tax trade equilibrium  ( ) 1 ... 0 n tt ==≡ is a 
special constant-tax trade equilibrium. When we later investigate the incidence of tax compe-
tition, we will exploit an equivalence between tax-competition equilibria and constant-tax 
trade equilibria which arises because due to (5) the capital market equilibrium depends on r 
and   through  1,..., n tt 1,..., n ρ ρ  only. In formal terms, we state that equivalence in 
Proposition 1   (Neutrality of uniform variations in tax rates). 
If  () { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Ett r x y k τττ τ τ τ τ τ = =    is a tax-competition equilibrium or a constant-tax 
trade equilibrium,  () { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Et t r x y k θτ τ τ τ τ τ τ θθ θ
= =+ + −    is a constant-tax trade 
equilibrium for all  r θ < . 
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Proposition 1 is a standard result in tax incidence theory. Uniform variations in capital tax 
rates are non-distortionary because the total supply of capital ( ) j jk =∑  is perfectly price 
inelastic. Thus uniform changes in all tax rates can be exactly offset by changes in the interest 
rate of equal size and opposite sign. Proposition 1 will be used in the proof of our main result 
in Section 4.2 below. 
 
3  From autarky to trade without taxation 
Our first step toward investigating gains or losses from tax competition is to explore the allo-
cative changes that occur when the countries move from autarky to trade in the absence of 
capital taxation. For the model introduced in the previous section, the reference scenario of 
autarky is straightforward. All capital markets are national and (5) is replaced by 
( ,
i
ii i kK r t w =+ ) i  for i = 1, …, n with   denoting the interest rate in country i. Note first that 
in autarky capital taxation is non-distortionary because the supply of capital is perfectly ine-
lastic in each country. Hence we set 
i r
0 i t ≡ , for convenience. Since we allow countries to dif-
fer in their fundamentals 'capital endowments', 'production technologies' and 'wage rates', the 
equilibrium interest rate in autarky will generally differ across countries. Using the general 
functional form (1) of the production function it is hard to specify properties of the mapping 
from the fundamentals to the autarkic equilibrium interest rate. We therefore resort to CES 
production functions in  
Proposition 2   (Determinants of the size of the equilibrium interest rate in autarky) 
Suppose capital is untaxed and country i's production function is CES, i.e. it satisfies 





ii o i k i i i i Yk , aa k a
− −− =+      ,                           ( 6 )  
where  ,  ,  ,  0 oi a > 0 ki a > 0 i a >   0 i σ > ,  1 i σ ≠ ,  ] [ 0,1 i b ∈ , and  ( ) :1 / ii e i σ σ =− . 
For any given elasticity of substitution,  0, 1 ii σ σ >≠ , country i's autarkic equilibrium interest 
rate,  , is decreasing in its capital endowment,  ia r i k . 
Following an increase in the rigid wage rate,   rises / remains unchanged / declines de-
pending on whether 
ia r
i σ  is greater than / equal to / smaller than  ( ) 1/ 1 1 ii cb = −> . 
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Clearly, expanding the capital endowment increases capital abundance and hence reduces the 
price for capital ( ). Increasing the wage rate makes capital scarcer ( ) or less scarce 
( ) depending on whether capital and labor are substitutes (
ia r ↓ ia r ↑
ia r ↓ i ci σ > ) or complements 
( i ci σ < ). Proposition 2 can be conveniently used to compare the autarkic equilibrium interest 
rate of different countries whose production functions are CES. To see that suppose some 
countries i and j are characterized by the parameters ( ) , ii kw and ( ) , jj kw and observe that 
implicitly Proposition 2 defines a function, say  , such that 
h R ( ) ,
h
ha h h rR k w =  for h = i, j. If 
both countries use the same production function (
ij RRR = = ), they have the same autarkic 
interest rate ( ), if and only if  ia ja rr = ( ) ( ) , ii j j , R kw Rkw = . Moreover, the inequality   
holds, if, ceteris paribus, either {
ia ja rr >
i kk < j j } or {  and  i ww > c σ > } or {  and  i ww < j c σ < }. 
Suppose now that all countries have attained their autarkic equilibrium and the borders are 
subsequently opened for trade in capital and the consumption good while all governments 
refrain from taxation. It is straightforward from (5) (with  0 i t ≡  for all i) that the no-tax trade 
equilibrium interest rate, denoted  , satisfies  , when   is the smallest and 
 is the largest autarkic equilibrium interest rate of all countries and   <  . For any 
country i with autarkic interest rate   the allocative consequences of the transition from au-
tarky to the no-tax trade equilibrium clearly depend on the sign of the difference  . We 
take this difference as our point of departure for analyzing the impact of moving from autarky 
to the no-tax trade equilibrium and explicitly allow for different production technologies. The 
results are summarized in 
o r










oi rr − a
Proposition 3   (Transition from autarky to no-tax trade) 
Suppose all governments refrain from taxation ( 0 i t ≡  for all i) and consider the transition of 
the n-country economy from its autarky equilibrium (subscript a) to its zero-tax trade equilib-
rium (subscript o).  
(i)   The allocative impacts of that transition are summarized in Table 1. 
 (ii)  Suppose the cases 1 or 7 in Table 1 apply and the production functions are Cobb-    
    Douglas, defined by 
  8   
   ()
ii i
ii ii Yk , k
α β =       for all i with  0, i α >   0 ii i and b : 1 i β αβ >+ = < .              (7) 
    If the production functions are the same across countries ( i α α =  and  i β β = , all i)  
    then the following equivalences hold: 
   Ø iio i a i o i a i o kk r r x ω
>> < ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫
=⇔ = ⇔ = ⇔ = ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬
<< > ⎩⎭ ⎩⎭ ⎩⎭ ⎩⎭
   i a x
<
>
,                    (8) 


















(iii)  If Case 6 in Table 1 applies and the production function is CES, (6), country i loses  
    from trade if the elasticity of substitution in production,  i σ , satisfies 
   () ( ) io i i o io
ii
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oi rr > a a   oi rr = oi rr a <    
0
i
r L <   0
i
r L > 0
i
r L = 0
i
r L > − < 0
i
r L = 0
i
r L >   0
i
r L <  
Case No.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
io ia −      - + 0 0 0 - + 
io ia kk −   - - - 0 +  + + 
io ia yy −   - ? - 0 + ? + 
io ia x x −   ? (-)  
) ∗ + + 0 -  ? (-)
) ∗   + 
               For details see the Propositions 2ii and 2iii  ) ∗
Table 1: Allocative impacts of the transition from autarky to no-tax trade 
 
A few remarks on Table 1 are in order. The top row distinguishes the cases in which country 
i's autarkic equilibrium interest rate,  , is lower than, equal to or higher than the world mar-
ket interest rate in the no-tax trade equilibrium,  . Note that one can combine that informa-
tion with the results established in Proposition 2 to trace the difference   to differences 
in capital endowments and rigid wages
ia r
o r
oi rr − a
                                                
10. The second row in Table 1 relates to properties of 
 
a
10 Recall that Proposition 2 allows identifying the capital endowments and the wage rates as determinants of the 
differences   for the case of identical CES production functions.  oi rr −
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the labor demand of country i's firm, which in turn are determined by properties of the pro-
duction function as shown in equation (2). To be more specific, if production functions are 
Cobb-Douglas, (7), we have  . Hence for Cobb-Douglas the Cases 1, 4 and 7 apply. 
CES production functions (6) exhibit 
0
i
k Y >  
0
i
k Y < − >   , if and only if  i c σ >
i − < . Therefore, such functions 
are examples for the Cases 2, 4 and 6, if  i ci σ > , for the Cases 1, 4 and 7, if  i ci σ < , and for 
the knife-edge Cases 3 and 5, if  i ci σ = . Case 4 is trivial but not entirely uninteresting for 
some conclusions in the next section. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the cases 1 and 6 in Table 1 
The results listed in Table 1 can be easily illustrated. In Figure 1 we take up the Cases 1 and 6 
of Table 1 that are unclear in the sign of  io ia x x −  and leave the illustration of the other cases 
to the reader. In both panels of Figure 1,   is given by the area  ia y 0 i BCk , and   is given 
by
io y
0 io AEk . In Case 1 capital is exported, and the value of these exports is equal to the area 
i kD E k i o  in the left panel of Figure 1. In Case 6 capital is imported, and the value of these im-
ports is equal to the area  i kD E k i o  in the right panel of Figure 1. It follows that in Case 1 [Case 
6] we have  0 io i x AEDk =  such that  io x  is smaller than / equal to / greater than  ia x , if and only 
if the area ABFE [ABCF] is greater than / equal to / smaller than DFC [DFE]. 
According to Table 1 country i unambiguously gains from trade in the Cases 2, 3 and 7, while 
the welfare change in the Cases 1 and 6 remains unclear for general production functions. To 
gain additional insights in changes of national income in the unclear cases, we have specified 
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the production technology in Proposition 3ii by Cobb-Douglas functions thus restricting the 
focus of Proposition 3ii to the Cases 1 or 7 of Table 1, as argued above.  
The striking result of Proposition 3ii is that with Cobb-Douglas functions countries lose from 
trade – and suffer from higher unemployment - in Case 1 of Table 1 and they gain from trade 
– and enjoy higher employment - in Case 7 of Table 1.
11 Proposition 3iii demonstrates that 
countries with CES production functions may also lose from trade if the elasticity of substitu-
tion is large enough. 
As mentioned above, for CES production functions we can use Proposition 2 to specify condi-
tions on fundamentals under which a country will export or import capital after the borders 
are opened. For Cobb-Douglas functions Proposition 3ii establishes an even more informative 
clear relationship between the difference in interest rates,  ia o rr − , on the one hand and capital 
endowments and wages of all countries, on the other hand. It is therefore worthwhile analyz-
ing and interpreting (8) in some more detail. Suppose first the countries differ in their capital 
endowments only. If the level of rigid wages is the same in all countries, we have  1 i ω =  for 
all i such that (8) is turned into 
   Ø i o ia io ia kk rr x
>> ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫
=⇔ =⇔= ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬





Under these conditions country i loses [gains] from trade, if and only if its capital endowment 
exceeds [falls short of] the countries' average capital endowment,  Ø k . If capital is relatively 
abundant ( Ø i kk > ), country i's equilibrium interest rate in autarky is low ( ) and is 
bound to rise when capital is internationally traded. Recall that 
ia o rr <
0
i
r K <  holds for all strictly 
concave production functions, and that  0
i
r L <  holds because of (7). Therefore country i will 
use less capital and labor and will consequently produce less output, so much less, that the 
(new) revenues from exporting capital do not compensate for the reduction in output.
12 Con-
versely, countries with a relatively small capital endowment ( Ø i kk < ) will face a lower inter-
est rate in trade equilibrium ( ) which, in turn, boosts the input of both capital and labor 
such that the extra value of output is greater than the expenditure on capital imports. This re-
ia o rr >
                                                 
11 Case 7 applies for more general production functions as well. 
12 Note that if the wage rate were flexible,   would shrink to restore the full employment equilibrium in the 
labor market which would then tend to boost domestic production.  
i w
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sult confirms the gains from trade stated already under more general conditions in the Case 7 
of Table 1. 
To focus on the role played by rigid wages, suppose all countries are endowed with the same 
amount of capital,  Ø 1 ... n kk k = ==, but differ with respect to their wage rates. Invoking (8), 
we establish the following equivalences: 




>< ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫
⇔= ⇔ ⇔= ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬
<> ⎩⎭ ⎩⎭ ⎩⎭ ⎩⎭













∑   .  
Hence in that case, there is a positive number  , the same for all countries, such that country 
i loses / is equally well off / gains from trade, if and only if its wage   is above / equal to / 
below  . The magnitude of the threshold value   is unclear. We would like to know, in par-
ticular, how   relates to  , the average wage. One can show
w  
i w
w   w  
w   Ø : j j ww =∑ / n
13 that 





jj jj nw w
β β β + ⎡⎤ >> ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∑∑ . 
In other words, in an economy with a sufficiently large number of countries only those coun-
tries lose from trade whose wage rate is well above the average wage rate. Note that the 
threshold value which needs to be exceeded for the number of countries to be large enough 
depends on the level of wage rates and on parameters of the Cobb-Douglas technology. 
To highlight the consequences of rigid wages in the transition from autarky to trade from an-
other perspective, we establish 
Proposition 4   (Transition from autarky to no-tax trade with flexible wages) 
Suppose that all governments refrain from taxation ( 0 i t ≡  for all i), that wages are flexible, 
and that production functions are Cobb-Douglas, (7), the same across countries. The transi-
tion of the n-country economy from autarky (subscript a) to its no-tax trade equilibrium (sub-
script o) is characterized by 
  Ø iio i a i o i a i o km k rr ww x
>> < ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫ ⎧⎫
=⇔ = ⇔ = ⇔ = ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬













     (9) 
                                                 
13 The proof is provided at the end of the Appendix. 
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As expected, Proposition 4 confirms for the model at hand the general gains-from-trade result 
for economies with a full set of perfectly competitive markets. In the present context the pur-
pose of Proposition 4 is to use (9) as a reference for further interpretation of the equivalences 
(8) from Proposition 3ii. To keep the exposition simple, we restrict that comparison to wage 
rates and labor endowments satisfying the condition  1 ii m ω = = , which holds, e.g., if we set 
 in Proposition 3ii and  12 ... n ww w == = 12 ... n mm m = ==  in Propositions 4. Obviously, in 
that case the first equivalences in (8) and (9) are the same. However, (9) shows that maintain-
ing full employment of labor after opening the borders results in a lower wage rate in capital-
rich countries and a higher wage rate in capital-poor countries. In the capital-rich country we 
find that  , where the wage rates   and  , respectively, are equilibrium rates 
in autarky and trade in the flexible-wage scenario of Proposition 4, while   is the rigid wage 
rate of Proposition 3ii. Hence when the wage rate is rigid, allowing for trade widens the dif-
ference between the rigid wage rate and the respective equilibrium wage rates in case of flexi-
ble wages  . As a consequence, the labor market disequilibrium is 
aggravated and unemployment rises, which in turn reduces national income (last equivalence 
in (8)). In contrast, for the capital-poor country we find the inequalities   which 
imply that opening the borders for trade reduces the difference between the rigid wage rate 
and the respective equilibrium wage rates in case of flexible wages 
io ia i www << io w ia w
i w
() ( ii o ii a ww ww ⎡ −> − ⎣ ) ⎤ ⎦
ia io i www <<
( )( ) ii o ii a ww ww ⎡ ⎤ −< − ⎣ ⎦. 
Therefore trade diminishes the labor market disequilibrium and thus raises employment as 
well as national income. 
 
4    From trade without taxation to capital tax competition 
Having clarified the allocative consequences of the transition from autarky to trade without 
taxation in the previous section we now take as our point of departure the trade equilibrium 
without taxation and analyze the allocative impact of tax competition. As a first step toward 
that end it is necessary and useful to take a closer look at the government's optimization calcu-
lus. 
4.1  Properties and implications of an individual government's optimal capital tax 
By assumption, governments choose their capital tax as to secure the maximum national in- 
come (= welfare), (4), for any given interest rate. The resultant optimal tax rates are character- 
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ized in 
Proposition 5   (Properties of the optimal capital tax). 














.                           (10) 



















   and   0 ii tr β = −< .              ( 1 1 )  
where  ,  ,  0 ki a > 0 i a >   1 i σ ≠ ,  ( ) :1 /1 ii cb =−  and  : ii rt ρ = + . 
Since  , the optimal tax rate is negative if the production function is Cobb-
Douglas. In case of CES production functions we have 
0
ii




k Y < − >   , if and only if  , and 
therefore   if and only if  . When production functions are Cobb-Douglas, the op-
timal tax rates are uniform across countries, if and only if the technology is the same in all 
countries. Interestingly, differences with respect to their capital endowments and wage rates 
do not translate into differences in optimal tax rates. When production functions are CES, the 
optimal tax rates are the same across countries, if and only if all countries have identical pro-
duction functions and identical wage rates. Differences in capital endowments do not matter. 
Cases of uniform identical tax rates will be of some interest in Section 4.2 below. 
i c σ > − < i
i
                                                
0 i t < − > i c σ < − >
By presupposition, if the government sets its tax rate according to (10), the country's income 
is maximized. But it is not clear how income maximization changes the level of employment, 
in particular, if we allow for different signs of  . We provide the answer in 
i
k Y 
Proposition 6   (Income maximization always promotes employment) 
 
i 14 Note that in (10) the terms  and
i LK
ρ ρ  are functions of  .  i t
15 The equation (10) has been derived by Fuest and Huber (1999) and later by Ogawa et al. (2006). Fuest and 
Huber (1999) employ a right-to-manage model of wage bargaining for the labor market. When they model gov-
ernments maximizing utility for a given wage rate; they derive an optimal tax rate in their equation (26) equal to 
(10) for  . Ogawa et al. (2006) derive (10) in a setup where governments levy a head tax and a capital tax 
and finance a public good. Irrespective of these differences, the rationale of levying the capital tax in the present 
model is the same as in Fuest and Huber (1999) and Ogawa et al. (2006). 
'0 e =
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Let   be the optimal tax rate of government i (satisfying (10)), if some interest rate   pre-
vails. Irrespective of the sign of  (i.e. the sign of  ) it is true that the government's optimal 










oii o i Lr tw Lrw
∗ ⎡⎤ +> ⎣⎦
To see the rationale of that synergism observe that the change in national income resulting 




i X YK YL r K ρ ρρ =+ −  = ()
ii
io i rK w L ρ ρ ρ −+  = 
ii
ii tK wL ρ ρ + , 
if the wage rate is rigid. If the labor market were perfectly competitive, the term 
ii YL ρ    with 
 would be absent. As an immediate implication optimality would require to abstain 
from taxation ( ). However, since the wage rate is rigid, the derivative of na-
tional income with respect to the tax rate is equal to the sum of the components 
i
i Yw =  
0
i
ti Xt =⇔= 0
( )
i
io rK ρ ρ −  
and 
i
i wL ρ . To interpret these terms suppose capital is taxed ( 0 ii o tr ρ = −>) in the initial 
situation and the tax rate is increased,  0 ii dt dρ = > . We then observe the partial marginal 
benefit effect   of increased capital export revenues or reduced expenditures on capi-









io rK ρ ρ −<
i
i wL ρ  depends on whether   or  0
i
k Y >   0
i




k Y >  
0 ii dt dρ => ) diminishes the marginal productivity of labor,  , ceteris paribus. 
However, the first-order condition for profit maximization, 
i Y 
i
i Yw =   , and the rigid wage rate 
 induce the firm to 'restore' the former level of  . It does so by reducing its labor input, 
 such that   is another marginal cost term yielding 




i Lρ < 0
i
i wL ρ <
() 0
ii
ti o i Xr K w L ρρ ρ =− + <
i 0 i t > i x  
it is therefore necessary to choose  i r ρ <  and hence a capital subsidy,  , in this scenario. 
Analogous arguments apply to the case 
0 i t <
0
i
k Y <   . 
Recall the qualification of Proposition 6 that government i's promotion of employment is sub-
ject to the condition that it takes the interest rate as given. To fix our ideas take as the baseline 
the no-tax trade equilibrium with its equilibrium interest rate   and suppose that all govern- o r
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ments introduce their optimal capital tax taking the interest rate   as given. The clear impli-
cation of Proposition 6 is that all countries will raise their income as well as their level of em-
ployment. The bad news is, however, that the world capital market will not be in equilibrium 
anymore. Hence to restore equilibrium the world interest rate will have to change, in general, 
giving rise to the possibility that tax competition may partly offset or perhaps even defeat the 
government's effort to promote both welfare and employment. We will study that issue in the 
following subsection. 
o r
4.2  The impact of tax competition as compared to trade without taxation 
 
Starting from the scenario of trade without taxation we wish to determine how tax competi-
tion changes the allocation attained in the no-tax trade equilibrium. In other words, we now 
take as a benchmark the no-tax trade equilibrium and compare the pertaining allocation with 
the allocation attained in tax-competition equilibrium. Analogous to the role of the difference 
 in case of the transition from autarky to trade (Proposition 3), the change in the inter-
est rate from   (no-tax trade equilibrium) to 
ia o rr −
o r r τ  (tax-competition equilibrium) will now turn 
out to play an important role. It is therefore important to know what determines the sign of the 
difference  . A clear-cut answer is possible, if  o rr τ − sign i t τ  is the same for all i. If   for 
all i, then   because 
0 i tτ <
o rr τ > ( ) ,
j
jo j jj kK r t τ <+ ∑∑ j w . In that case r must rise to restore equi-
librium on the capital market, (5). Likewise, if    for all i, then   because  0 i tτ > o rr τ <
( ,
j
jo j jj kK r t τ >+ ∑∑ ) j w . Now r must decline to restore equilibrium on the capital market. 
If technologies are mixed such that  0 i tτ <  for some countries and   for others, the dif-
ference   may take on either sign. 
0 i tτ >
o rr τ −
Keeping these preliminaries in mind we are now ready to compare the allocations of the no-
tax trade equilibrium and the tax-competition equilibrium in  
Proposition 7   (Transition from trade without taxation to tax competition) 
Consider the no-tax trade equilibrium  () { } 1 1,..., : 0,..., 0, , , , , oo n o o i o i o i o i o in Et t r x y k
= == =    and 
the associated tax-competition equilibrium  () { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Ett r x y k τττ τ τ τ τ τ = =   , where 
i t τ  satisfies (10) for all i. The allocation ( ) 1,..., ,,, iiii i xyk ττττ =  
n  of the tax-competition equilib-
rium deviates from the no-tax trade allocation ( ) 1,..., ,,, io io io io i xyk
=  
n  as shown in Table 2. 




o rr τ −   sign
i Lρ   ( sign i tr τ +  ) o   No. ii τ −      ii kk τ o −   ii yy τ − o o   ii x x τ −  
0 i tr τ +<  
) ∗   1  + + + +   
0
i Lρ <  
0 i tr τ +>     2 -  - - - 
 
o rr τ >  
0
i Lρ >   0 i tr τ +>     3  + - ? - 
o rr τ ≠   0
i Lρ ≠   0 i tr τ +=     4  0 0 0 0 
o rr τ =   0
i Lρ =   0 i tτ =   5  0 0 0 0 
0
i Lρ <   0 i tr τ +<     6  + + + - 
0 i tr τ +>     7 +  -  ?  + 
 
o rr τ <  
0
i Lρ >  
0 i tr τ +<     8 -  +  ?  - 
          ) ∗ : o rrr τ =−
Table 2: Transition from trade without taxation to tax competition 
Table 2 calls for some comments. The very first column lists the possible constellations of the 
respective equilibrium interest rates analogous to the top row in Table 1. As in Table 1, each 
of the Cases 1 - 8 of Table 2 is characterized by the sign of 
i Lρ  (second column) but a new 
attribute is the sign of   (third column). The meaning and role of the term   is 
made precise in the proof of Proposition 7 in the Appendix. There we show that if the interest 
rate   of the no-tax trade equilibrium prevails (rather than the interest rate 
i t τ + r i tr τ + 
o r r τ  of the tax-
competition equilibrium) and if all governments j choose  j t τ r +  , then the allocation of the 
tax-competition equilibrium is attained.
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It is informative to combine the results of Table 2 with the information provided in Proposi-
tion 5. Recall from (11) that   holds, in particular but not only, for Cobb-Douglas func-
tions and CES functions satisfying 
0
i Lρ <
i ci σ < . Yet if the technology is Cobb-Douglas, the Cases 
1 and 2 apply only if the Cobb-Douglas functions differ across countries. Otherwise Case 4 
applies. Case 5 represents a knife-edge case corresponding to the Cases 3 and 5 of Table 1 
which happens to occur when all production functions are when all production functions are 
                                                 
16 Consider for example the constellation   (or  o rr τ > 0
o rrr
τ = −>   ) and  0
i Lρ <  in Table 2. Owing to  0
i Lρ <  
we have   such that   may take on either sign generating one of the Cases 1, 2 or 4.  0 i t τ < j t τ + r
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CES with  i ci σ = . The properties of production functions leading to the Cases 6, 7 and 8 in 
Table 2 can be indentified in analogy to the properties on the Cases 1, 2 and 3. 
Note finally that if   and   (Case 3),  o rr τ > 0
i Lρ > 0 i tr τ + <    is not a feasible outcome. If 
 and   (Case 6),   is not a feasible outcome either. A necessary condi-
tion for the Cases 3 and 6 to occur is that there are technologies exhibiting   for some 
countries and   for others. 
o rr τ < 0
i Lρ < 0 i tr τ +>  
0 k Y >  
0 k Y <  
In those special tax-competition equilibria in which the tax rates  1 ,..., n tt τ τ  are uniform across 
countries (Case 4 and trivially Case 5 of Table 2)
17 the allocations of the tax-competition 
equilibrium  Eτ  and the no-tax trade equilibrium  o E  coincide as a consequence of Proposition 
1. Tax competition then has no allocative impact at all. 
Consider next the tax incidence in the plausible case of tax competition where tax rates differ 
across countries. Focusing on employment we observe, rather unexpectedly, that variations in 
employment are clear in sign under all conditions: Unless tax rates are uniform (see above) 
employment either improves or shrinks. For either sign of the difference   employment 
declines [increases] if 
o rr τ −
( ) 0 ii tt r ττ ⋅+<    [ ( ) 0 ii tt r ττ ⋅ +>   ]. The constellation   and 
 or vice versa occurs under two conditions: (i) 
0 i tτ <
() 0 i tr τ +>   i t τ  and  o rr τ −  must exhibit oppo-
site signs and (ii)  i t τ  must be sufficiently close to zero.  
While all signs of changes in factor inputs and income are clear, the changes in the level of 
output are ambiguous in the Cases 3, 7 and 8 where sign ( ii o τ −    )⋅( ii kk τ o − ) is negative. 
The striking result of Proposition 7 is that countries may lose from tax competition if the sce-
nario of trade without taxation is taken as the baseline. Under the conditions specified in 
Proposition 7 country i may suffer a welfare loss and such a loss can occur under various as-
sumptions. Country i's technology may satisfy   (Cases 2 and 6) or   (Cases 3 
and 8) or the constellation   (Cases 2 and 3) or 
0
i
k Y >   0
i
k Y <  
o rr τ > o rr τ <  (Cases 6 and 8) may be given. To 
see the driving force for the welfare loss, consider Case 2 in Table 2 as an example.  i tr τ +   
will be positive, if country i's tax rate  i t τ  is negative but relatively small in absolute value (see 
                                                 
17 Case 4 applies, e.g., when all countries produce with identical Cobb-Douglas functions or when all countries 
produce with identical CES functions and their rigid wage rates are identical. See our comments on Proposition 
5. 
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the proof of Proposition 7)
18. Hence in tax-competition equilibrium we find that 
( ) ,
i
ii Lr t w ττ += () ( ) ,
ii
oi i o i Lr t r w Lrw τ ++ <   ,  because  0
i Lρ <  is presupposed in Case 2, and 
() ( ) ( ) ,,
ii i
ii o i i o i Kr tw Kr t r w Kr w ττ τ +=+ +<   ,  because  0
i Kρ < . The straightforward impli-
cation is that the output shrinks ( ). On the other hand, since  ii yy τ < o i o i kk τ < , country i's value 
of exports rises or the cost of its imports declines. However that partial income increase is 
smaller than the loss from reduced production because the per unit cost of capital as an input, 
, is higher than  , the per unit revenue from increased capital exports or from re-
duced capital imports. 
oi rt r τ ++   o r
 
5    From autarky to tax competition 
Proposition 3 scrutinized the shift from autarky to the no-tax trade equilibrium and Proposi-
tion 7 analyzed the allocative impact of moving from the no-tax trade equilibrium to the tax-
competition equilibrium. It is therefore necessary combining both steps in an effort to answer 
the question what the allocative consequences are for individual countries of moving from 
autarky to tax competition. As for income changes, closer inspection of the Tables 1 and 2 
reveals that the sign of those changes is unclear in several cases. Obviously, since the sign of 
the difference  io ia x x −  is unclear in the Cases 1 and 6 of Table 1, the net welfare change from 
autarky to tax competition is bound to be ambiguous. However, even if the partial welfare 
effects in the Tables 1 and 2 are clear in sign, the net effect is also ambiguous, whenever the 
partial effects exhibit opposite signs. Although it is not possible to fully exploit the complex 
information presented in the Propositions 3 and 7, we restrict our attention to changes in un-
employment and welfare and select some specific cases in 
Proposition 8   (Losses from autarky to tax competition). 
Consider the transition of the n-country economy from autarky to tax competition. 
(i)   Country i suffers a welfare loss, if all countries use identical Cobb-Douglas production 
    functions , (7), and if  Ø ii kk ω >  holds. 
                                                 
18 For example, if all production functions are Cobb-Douglas and differ across countries with respect to their 
parameter  β , we conclude from   (which is presupposed in Case 2) and  0 r >   0 ii tr ττ β = −<  from equation 
(11) that   , if   0 ii i tt r rr ττ τ β =+= − +>      i β  is a sufficiently small component in ( ) 12 , ,..., n β ββ . 
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(ii)  Country i suffers a welfare loss, if the production functions satisfy   for all i (as 
    e.g. in case of Cobb-Douglas or CES with 
0
i
k Y >  
i ci σ < ), if  ia o rr =  and if  i t τ  is small enough 
    in absolute value relative to the other countries' optimal tax rates. 
(iii)  Country i suffers a welfare loss, if   (implying  ia o rr > io i kk > ), if its production function 
    is CES satisfying  () ( )/ i i io i i o io i io ckk w r qw k σ >+ − + , and 
  -  either if   for all i and  0
i
k Y <   i t τ  is small enough relative to the other countries' opti-
   mal  tax  rates, 
  -  or if all countries use the same CES production function as country i and wage rates 
      are the same across countries.  
(iv)  In all scenarios of the Propositions 8i, 8ii and 8iii country i suffers from increasing un-
    employment in the transition from autarky to tax competition. 
The principal message of Proposition 8 is that capital market liberalization with tax competi-
tion can lead to rising unemployment and welfare losses under various conditions. Welfare 
losses can be derived by combining in various ways the countries' fundamentals, i.e. their 
wage rates, capital endowments and production technologies. It is conceded that all cases pre-
sented in Proposition 8 make use of conditions that are more or less restrictive. Yet all these 
conditions are sufficient but not necessary. In our view, it is therefore safe to conjecture that 
losses from tax competition are not an elusive phenomenon. Take for example Proposition 8ii. 
Its range – and relevance - is certainly limited because the condition  ia o rr =  is very special, if 
it is fulfilled at all for any country. However, a welfare loss will also occur if the condition 
 of Proposition 8ii is replaced by  ia o rr = ia o rr ≠  as long as if the difference  ia o rr −  is small 
enough. When the condition   (Case 4 of Table 1) is weakened in this non-rigorous 
way, welfare losses can also be identified in the Cases 3, 6 and 8 of Table 2. Moreover, in all 
cases of uniform optimal tax rates which we identified in our remarks on equation (11) some 
countries lose when moving from autarky to tax competition, if and only if they lose in the 
transition from autarky to trade without taxation. 
ia o rr =
 
7   Concluding  remarks 
We have shown that unemployment markedly changes the impact of capital market liberaliza-
tion and capital-tax competition among heterogeneous countries as compared to the case of 
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perfectly competitive labor markets. With autarky as the reference scenario, the introduction 
of international capital mobility and tax competition turned out to have the potential of reduc-
ing the welfare and/or of exacerbating unemployment in some countries. Hence such coun-
tries will not be in favor of capital market liberalization unless they succeed in removing wage 
rigidity. Since we allowed countries to differ with respect to capital endowments, rigid wage 
rates and production technologies, there is a great variety of outcomes and welfare changes 
which can hardly be characterized completely. Nonetheless, we identified a number of spe-
cific cases where countries suffer higher unemployment and a welfare loss during the transi-
tion from autarky to tax competition and traced the reasons for that outcome. As could be ex-
pected, less general assumptions on production functions yielded more informative results. 
For example, in case of Cobb-Douglas technology we were able to fully characterize the allo-
cative displacement effects. We showed that in the transition from autarky to tax competition 
countries fare the better, ceteris paribus, the greater is their capital endowment or the lower is 
their rigid wage rate. 
The rigid-wage assumption is a very simple and coarse way to model unemployment given 
the great variety of sophisticated and complex theories of non-competitive wage formation 
developed in labor economics (Nickel 1990). One small step in relaxing that assumption in 
future research work would be to retain downward rigidity but allow for upward flexible 
wages. More complex and arguably more realistic labor market theories have already been 
employed in some studies of capital-tax competition with labor-markets imperfections some 
of which we have referenced in the Introduction. However, as we pointed out, none of these 
studies tackles unemployment and heterogeneous countries. The trade-off between realistic 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. In the tax-competition equilibrium 
() { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Ett r x y k τττ τ τ τ τ τ = =    the capital market is in equilibrium, by presupposi-
tion:  ( ,
j
j jj kK r t ττ =+ ∑∑ ) j j w . Consider  ] [ , r θ ∈− ∞  and define  : ii tt ττ θ = +    for all i and 
: rr ττ θ =−   . Then we obviously have  ( )( ) j ,,
jj
jj j j jj j k Krtw Krt w ττ ττ =+ =+ ∑ ∑∑       .      






dq w / r
qd w / r






. Rearrange this equation to obtain  ˆˆ ii i i i wr ˆ q σ σ −= . 
Furthermore, consider   as well as  ˆ ˆ ˆii qk =−  i
() ˆ ˆˆ
ii i i ii i ii
ii
ii i ii i
cq r cw qr
wr
wq r wq r






ˆˆ ii i i i wr σ σ −=  to obtain after some rearrangements of terms 
   () ˆ ˆˆ
ii i ii i
ii
ii i i i ii i i i
cw wq r
rk






i w , 
where  . If we set  () :1 /1 1 ii cb =− > i kk i =  and hence  ˆ ˆ
i kk i =  in that equation,   and 
 follows. That  proves Proposition 2.                          
ii rr = a
a ˆˆ ii rr =
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Proof of Proposition 3. Proposition 3i: Denote by  i x  and  ia x  the national incomes when the 
interest rate is r and  , respectively. Obviously, that implies  ia r ii a x x =  for  , and if 
 is monotone in r we are able to determine the sign of the difference 
ia rr =
i dx / dr io ia x x − . Differ-
entiation of  i x  with respect to r yields 














= = . Suppose that   and  . Then  ia rr > 0
i
r L > ( )()
ii
ii i a i kK r , w K r , w k i = <=  
and therefore  0 i dx
dr
> , proving  io ia x x >  for the case 2 in Table 1. Along the same lines we 
show that  io ia x x >  in the cases 3 and 7 and  io ia x x <  in case 5 in Table 1 . In the cases 1 and 6 
the sign of   is unclear.  i dx / dr
Proposition 3ii: (a) We first observe that the term  ii yr k i −  turns into   =   =  ii yr k − i
b
ii ii qr k
α −  
( )
1 b
ii ii i kk qr
α − −    when the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Interest rates   may differ 
across countries in autarky but they are uniform in the associated zero-tax equilibrium. We 
also know that 
i r
11 1 bb i








−     
α − − =   i r
α
= , because   is the first-




−− =   i r
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From this information the equations  
   () ,
i oi o










⎡⎤ −= ⎣⎦            ( A 2 )  
follow, where the indexes a and o refer to the autarky equilibrium and the zero-tax equilib-
rium, respectively. We write the difference in income of country   following a switch from 
autarky to free-trade as  
i
() ( ) () ,,
ii
i io ia io io o io ia ia i ia o i x x x Yk r k Yk r k r rk ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ∆= − = − − − − − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦     
and consider (A2) to obtain  i x αγ∆ ( ) 1 oi o i a i oi rk r k rk αγ αγ =−+ + ( ) oi o i rk k = − ( ) 1 oi rk αγ ++  - 
() 1 ia i rk αγ +  or 
   i x αγ∆   () () ( ) 1 oi o i i o i a rk k kr r αγ =− + + − .                  ( A 3 )  
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(b)  Next we determine the variables  ,   and   for the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. The first-order conditions for profit maximization 




− =  and 
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ii i wk l
α β β














ββ β β αβ








.                ( A 4 )  
In autarky, we have  ia i kk =  such that (A4) is turned into 
   ()
1
1 11 c




− −− = .                        ( A 5 )  
In case of free trade we convert (A4) into  ( ) ( ) 11 cc c
io o i kr
ββ c w
β β αβ
−− − − = . Invoke the equilibrium 
condition on the world capital market,  jo j j k =
j k ∑ ∑ , to obtain  jo j jj kk = ∑∑  = 





























































∑       (A6) 
To determine   we combine (A4) and (A6) which yields, after some rearrangement of 
terms, 
io k












.                   ( A 7 )  
(c)  Invoke   from (A5) and   from (A6) combined with (A7) and observe that  ia r o r
  oi a rr >






1 11 11 c c
ii i i wk w k
β
ββ ββ
β ββ ββ αβ ω αβ
−
− −− − − −− −− >
< ⋅    ⇔  
Ø i kk ω <
> i .    (A8) 
(d)  We now insert (A5), (A6) and (A7) in (A3): 
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κ = . From (A9) it is straightforward that  , if  0 i x ∆=
ii ω κ =  or  Ø i kk ω = i . To specify how  i x αγ∆  responds to changes in  Ø k  consider the deriva-
tives of (A9) 
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= . For this value of  Ø k  





















. Therefore, at its minimum  i x αγ∆  is 
negative. Moreover, since   for  0 i x ∆< Ø 0 k =  according to (A9), we conclude that   for  0 i x ∆>
Ø 0, ii kk ω ⎤⎡ ∈⎦⎣ ,   for  0 i x ∆= Ø ii kk ω =  and  0 i x ∆ <  for  ØØ , ii i kk n k ωω ⎤⎡ ∈⎦⎣ . 






=− − >  for all  [ ] , oi a rr r ∈  is sufficient for 









i  we find that  0 i dx
dr
>  holds, if for all  [ ] , oi a rr r ∈  
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− i  is decreasing and  i φ  is increasing in r, it follows that  
io i i i




≥   for all 
[ ] , oi a rr r ∈ . That proves Proposition 3iii.                          
Proof of Proposition 4. The strategy of proof is similar to that of Proposition 3ii. Country i's 
income is  ia ia x y ==   ii km
α β  in autarky and 
() ( ) io io o io i io i o io i x yr kkk mr kk
αβ =− −= − −                      ( A 1 2 )  
under free trade. In the latter case profit maximization implies 
  
1
oi o rk m i
α β α
− = .                                 ( A 1 3 )  
Combining (A12) and (A13) yields 
11
io io i io i io io i i x km k mk k mk
α βα β α β αα
−− =− +      () 1 io i km
αβ α =− +
1
ii o i kk m
α β α
− . Hence 
( )
1 1 ii o i a i o i i i o i i i x xx k m k k mk m
α βα β α αα
− ∆= − =− + −
β .                   (A14) 
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tain  Ø io i km k = . Use this information to turn (A14) into 
() ØØ
11 1 ii i i i i i i x mkm k m k m km
α αβ α α β αβ αα
−− ∆=− + − .                    (A15) 
It is straightforward from (A15) that  0 i x ∆ =  if  Ø ii km k = . To specify how  i x ∆  responds to 
changes in  i k  when  Ø k  is kept constant, consider the derivatives of (A15), 
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> ,   i x ∆  from (A15) 
attains its unique minimum at  Ø ii km k = .                          
Proof of Proposition 5. Equation (10) is straightforward from the first-order condition of 
maximizing (4) with respect to  :   i t
ii ii i
tk l
i X YK YL r K ρ ρ =+ − ρ  = ( )
i
i rK w L
i
i ρ ρ ρ −+  = 
. (11) follows from combining the equation (10) with (6) and (7) and the per-
taining factor demand functions.                            
0
ii
ii tK wL ρρ +=
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that  0
i Lρ <  and hence  i tτ  < 0. Starting from  , succes-
sive reductions of   decrease 
0 i t =
i t o rt i ρ =+  and therefore increase  ( ) ,
i
oii Lr tw + . Suppose next 
that   and hence  0
i Lρ > i tτ   > 0. Starting from  0 i t =  successive increases in   increase  i t
o rt i ρ =+  and therefore also increase  ( ) ,
i
oii Lr tw + .                    
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof proceeds in several steps. First we prove the 
Claim:  Associated with the equilibrium Eτ  is an 'auxiliary' constant-tax trade equilibrium
19 
() { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Ett r x y k τττ τ τ τ τ τ = =                 with the following properties: 
 (a)   () = () , 
1,..., ,,, iiii in xyk ττττ =
        
1,..., ,,, iiii in xyk ττττ =   ( ) 1 ,..., n tt τ τ     =   ( ) 1 ,..., n tr tr ττ ++    , 
     and hence  .  o rrr τ =−   o rr r r ττ =−=    
 (b)   () 1 ,..., n tt τ τ     in Eτ    contains positive and negative tax rates, if the tax rates  1 ,..., n tt τ τ  
   i n   Eτ  differ across countries; otherwise  1 ... 0 n tt ττ = ==    . 
The existence of the constant-tax trade equilibrium  ( ) { } 1 1,..., : ,..., , , , , , ni i i i in Ett r x y k τττ τ τ τ τ τ = =                 
as defined in part (a) of the Claim follows immediately from Proposition 1. Note that (5) im-
plies  j jk ∑  =   =  ( ,
j
oj jKr w ∑ ) ( ) ,
j
jj jKrtw ττ + ∑  =  ( ) ,
j
ji j Kr rt r w ττ −∆ + +∆ ∑  = 
. Part (b) of the Claim postulates that if tax rates  ( ,
j
oji jKrtw τ + ∑   ) 1 ,..., n tt τ τ  differ across 
                                                 
19  Eτ    provides the information about the tax rates needed for shifting from the no-tax trade equilibrium alloca-
tion to the tax-competition equilibrium allocation while keeping unchanged the interest rate prevailing in the no-
tax trade equilibrium. 
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countries, the tax rates  1 ,..., n tt τ τ     need to contain negative and positive components. Suppose 
not. Then  min sign t
τ    =  max sign t
τ    with   min 0 t
τ ≠    or  max 0 t
τ ≠   , where  min t
τ    and  max t
τ    are the mini-
mum and maximum components of ( ) 1 ,..., n tt τ τ    , respectively. That obviously implies  j jk ∑  = 
     contradicting the fact that  () ,
j
oj jKr w ∑ ≠ ( ,
j
oj j jKrtw τ + ∑   ) Eτ    is an equilibrium. If the 
tax rates  1 ,..., n tt τ τ  are uniform across countries, the (associated) tax rates  1 ,..., n tt τ τ     are also 
uniform because by definition of  i t τ    it is true that  : i tr i t τ τ = +      for all i and satisfy   
 by construction of  1 ... 0 n tt ττ == =    Eτ   . This completes the proof of the Claim. 
With this information we proceed to establish Proposition 7. We first focus on the change in 
employment induced by moving from  o E  to Eτ  by proving the equivalence  




 0  ⇔  ( ) ( ) ,,
ii




   ( ) ,
i
oi L rw. 
Consider the case that   and  0 i tτ ≤ 0 i tτ ≤   . We know that  0 i tτ ≤   ⇔   and therefore 
. Similarly, if   and  , we have   and 
therefore   as well. Based on this information it is straightforward to 





oi i o i Lr t w Lrw τ +≥   ) ,
) ,
0 i tτ ≥ 0 i tτ ≥   0 0
i
i tL τρ ≥⇔ ≥
() ( ,
ii
oi i o i Lr t w Lrw τ +≥  
0 ii tt ττ ⋅≤   ⇔ () ( ) ,,
ii
oi i o i L rt w L r w τ +≤   . 
The sign of the difference   (second column of Table 2) is easily calculated as being 
equal to the sign of 
i kk τ − i o
) (
i
i tK τ ρ ⋅   , since  0
i Kρ < .  
It remains to prove the signs in the last column of Table 2. Set  io i rt τ ρ = +    and differentiate 
i i oi oi x yr kr k =− +  with respect to  i t τ   :  
  
i
i ii i i i i i i i
ko i i i i
i
wL dx
YK YL rK tK wL t K
dt K
ρ
ρ ρρ τ ρρ τ
τ ρ
⎛⎞
=+ − =+= + ⎜ ⎜
⎝⎠
    
  ρ ⎟ ⎟ .                 (A16) 
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 and if  ii dx / dtτ    is monotone in  i t τ    we are 




ρ ρ  from (A16) with 
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  .                          ( A 1 7 )  
We conclude from (A17) that   
 
and 0 (Case1) or and 0 (Case 7)
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The Case 4 in Table 2 is obvious.                           
Proof of Proposition 8. Proposition 8i follows from combining Case 1 of Table 1 with Case 
4 of Table 2 and Proposition 3ii. Proposition 8ii follows from combining Case 4 of Table 1 
with Case 2 of Table 2. The first part of Proposition 8iii follows from combining Case 6 of 
Table 1 with Case 8 of Table 2 and Proposition 3iii. The second part of Proposition 8iii fol-
lows from combining Case 6 of Table 1 with Case 4 of Table 2 and Proposition 3iii.          





















We rearrange the inequality   and obtain   Ø 0 ww> −− <  
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.                     (A18) 
With   for   the inequality (A18) proofs the claim.                         0 i w > 1 i, , = … n
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